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Abstract:   The article seeks a re-conceptualization of 
the global digital divide debate. It critically explores 
the predominant notion, its evolution and measure-
ment, as well as the policies that have been advanced 
to bridge the digital divide. Acknowledging the com-
plexity of this inequality, the article aims at analyz-
ing the disparities beyond the connectivity and skills 
barriers. Without understating the first two digital di-
vides, it is argued that as the Internet becomes more 
sophisticated and more integrated into economic, so-
cial, and cultural processes, a “third” generation of di-
vides becomes critical. These divides are drawn not at 
the entry to the net but within the net itself, and limit 
access to content. The increasing barriers to con-
tent, though of a diverse nature, all relate to some 
governance characteristics inherent in cyberspace, 
such as global spillover of local decisions, regulation 
through code, and proliferation of self- and co-reg-
ulatory models. It is maintained that as the prac-
tice of intervention intensifies in cyberspace, multiple 
and far-reaching points of control outside formal le-
gal institutions are created, threatening the availabil-
ity of public goods and making the pursuit of public 
objectives difficult. This is an aspect that is rarely ad-
dressed in the global digital divide discussions, even 
in comprehensive analyses and political initiatives 
such as the World Summit on the Information Soci-
ety. Yet, the conceptualization of the digital divide as 
impeded access to content may be key in terms of 
ensuring real participation and catering for the long-
term implications of digital technologies.
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A. Introductory Remarks
1 Closing the digital gap has been viewed in all dis-
course flows as unambiguously positive and of pri-
mary importance. Especially in the initial years of 
the discussions on the digital divide, there seemed 
to have been a broad understanding that 
active participation in the information revolu-
tion will promote a country’s economic develop-
ment […] [and that] the Internet and new com-
munications technologies offer the less developed 
countries unprecedented opportunities to ac-
quire knowledge, “enhance educational systems, 
improve policy formation and execution, and wi-
den the range of opportunities for business and
the poor.”1
2 Beyond economic development, it is also of-
ten maintained that bridging the global digi-
tal divide 
“would facilitate the flow of information that helps
subvert authoritarian and repressive govern-
ments, thus promoting democracy, human rights, 
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and civil society, as well as transparency, open-
ness, and accountability of governing agencies.”2
3 These far-reaching promises have been translated 
into a number of policy initiatives. The grandest
among them is certainly the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS). The WSIS, organized un-
der the auspices of the International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU), comprised a pair of global sum-
mits held in Geneva in December 2003 and Tunis in 
November 2005, as well as an elaborate preparatory 
process involving a series of large regional confe-
rences and meetings held between May 2002 and
the Tunis summit. The WSIS outcome documents,
the Geneva Declaration of Principles 20033 and the 
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society 2005,4 set 
forth key principles for building an inclusive infor-
mation society, recognizing that education, know-
ledge, information, and communication are at the
core of human progress, endeavor, and wellbeing,
and highlighting the relationship between the WSIS 
action lines and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).5 Bridging the digital divide has been an es-
sential element of the WSIS process. Following up, 
manifold initiatives have been launched, mobilizing 
state and non-state agencies as well as civil society.6
4 With the benefit of hindsight, two observations
can be made in this respect. First, the extreme op-
timism of the early days of ICT aid has been now
somewhat reduced. It has been acknowledged that 
there are “substantial disparities in every […] dimen-
sion of life from health care and nutrition to educa-
tion and longevity,”7 and it would be rather naïve
to expect that there will be no absolute inequalities 
between rich and poor nations in the virtual world. 
It would also be unrealistic to assume that the In-
ternet would “suddenly eradicate the fundamental 
and intractable problems of disease, debt, and disa-
dvantage facing developing countries.”8 Also in this 
sense, it was recognized that the impact of ICT is in-
herently unequal: “[a]lthough in its initial years of 
mass diffusion the Internet was widely heralded as a 
potential equalizing tool across nations, the largely 
unequal patterns of its diffusion globally suggest that
it may end up contributing more to rising inequali-
ties rather than levelling the playing field across na-
tions.”9 Indeed, because technology and the social
practices of its use are constantly evolving, and be-
cause there are many variables within the complex 
notion of the divide, 
[t]he digital divide amplifies the already existing 
social inequalities cumulatively. An important ex-
perience of developed countries is that the problem
of the digital divide persists even in periods when 
ICT penetration in society is high, since new tech-
nologies and tools (e.g. broadband, mobile devices,
Web 2.0, etc.) enter the markets, generating new 
lines of division.10
5 Second, with regard to policy design, it has been ack-
nowledged that there exist no “one-size-fits-all” so-
lutions, as developing countries have proved to be 
profoundly diverse with starkly different economic, 
social, and institutional conditions and technology 
adoption patterns.11 Accordingly, the measures for 
bridging the global digital divide are now much more
pragmatic. They are targeted at specific goals and
use tailor-made tools that are meant to provide not 
only one-off aid but also conditions for sustainable 
access to information, which go far beyond cheap
computers to involve local capacity-building and
deeper social and institutional reforms.12
6 While most of these initiatives would fall under the 
category of development aid, it must be stressed that
the role of law, in particular international econo-
mic law, although not directly targeted at the digi-
tal divide, has been significant in reducing the entry 
thresholds to cyberspace. International trade rules 
have contributed by addressing broader economic 
concerns of dismantling barriers to trade, liberali-
zation of markets and spurring competition, foreign 
direct investment and private–public partnerships.13
Here, it is essential to understand that the digital
divide issues cannot be isolated and disconnected
from other policy domains such as telecommunica-
tions and media regulation, standardization, trade 
in networked goods and services, intellectual pro-
perty, or competition policy, and there is a strong 
need to “view these issues in a more holistic man-
ner – as elements of a single overarching policy space
rather than as a random assortment of disconnected
topics that are somehow related to ICT.”14
B. Beyond the “First” Divide
7 Over the years, diverse points of critique have targe-
ted different aspects of the existing initiatives aimed
at bridging the digital divide. It is, for instance, often
maintained that very few of the ICT for development
(ICT4D) initiatives have worked in practice;15 that
the neo-liberal paradigm that underlies the WSIS is 
misplaced and there is no real (financial) commit-
ment from developed countries;16 that the WSIS pro-
cess has in fact achieved little and has abandoned its 
higher objectives.17 The critique we develop in the 
following sections is somewhat different. We argue 
that as digital technologies advance and as the ins-
titutional ecology of the networked digital environ-
ment evolves, attention should be shifted from ac-
cess to technology to access to content.
I. The Many Divides18
8 To be sure, the focus so far has been predominantly 
on simple Internet access, i.e., on the practical pos-
sibility of opening a web page and surfing the net 
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through a device (be it a computer, mobile phone, 
TV set, or game console). In the early discussions, 
this – let us dub it the “first” divide – was thought 
sufficient to becoming a citizen of the information 
society, and it was envisaged that the positive eco-
nomic and social spillovers of being linked to the In-
ternet, as sketched above, would somehow automa-
tically unfold.
9 Connectivity, however, is nothing but the first tier. 
As the Internet becomes ubiquitous and penetra-
tes all facets of contemporary societal life, new and 
different tiers of division and discrimination seem 
to emerge. In the national context of industrialized 
countries, experience shows that 
what was considered the original digital divide is 
largely resolved […]. Today the digital divide re-
sides in differential ability to use new media to
critically evaluate information, analyze, and in-
terpret data, attack complex problems, test inno-
vative solutions, manage multifaceted projects,
collaborate with others in knowledge production, 
and communicate effectively to diverse audiences 
− in essence, to carry out the kinds of expert thin-
king and complex communication that are at the 
heart of the new economy.19
10 “Whereas the first digital divide could be solved sim-
ply by providing a computer and an Internet connec-
tion, this [second] digital divide presents a greater 
challenge.”20 It relates to skills, broadly defined as a 
set of multifaceted capabilities to efficiently and ef-
fectively navigate in cyberspace, to create, contri-
bute, and distribute content.21 The level of sophisti-
cation of these skills becomes critical to ensure real 
participation, as users’ behavior studies22 as well as 
the acts of mobilizing communities in the recent
Arab revolutions23 show. 
11 Developing countries have already been disadvan-
taged as latecomers in the evolving process of buil-
ding the information society, both in terms of par-
ticipation and representation. Internet governance 
is a clear example of influencing cyberspace’s ar-
chitecture in the early stages, and the subsequent
hard-fought attempts of developing countries to be-
come part of the decision-making processes are also 
revealing.24 In terms of representation and further-
reaching implications, as Mark Cooper argues, 
[t]his is a vicious cycle. If a particular cultural
group is not represented early in the creation of 
the medium, culturally relevant applications of
technology and content do not get produced for
that group. Since there are not as many culturally 
relevant applications of the technology, mem-
bers of that group tend to adopt the technology
more slowly. Having the technology now versus
having the technology later is the difference bet-
ween being a passive consumer and being an en-
gine and driver of the medium. Being there when 
the architecture is defined means one’s needs and 
demands will be reflected in the face of the new 
medium.25
12 Admittedly, with the greater sophistication of the
digital divide debates over time, this second “skills” 
tier of separation has also gained prominence and 
increasingly more suitable tools have been imple-
mented to address it.26 This is important and is con-
sistent with the “capabilities approach” as put for-
ward by Amartya Sen27 and Martha Nussbaum,28 and 
with Sen’s seminal argument for “development as
freedom,” intertwining issues of social justice and
human rights with the objective of generating eco-
nomic growth.29
13 In this article, however, the aim is to thematize a
third division, which is to be understood as a pro-
cess of drawing new digital divides and happens in
cyberspace.
II. The Digital Divide as Impeded 
Access to Content
14 The multifaceted and further-reaching repercus-
sions of cyberspace have already been well explo-
red,30 though their effects are not definitive as digital
technologies advance, become more deeply integra-
ted in all facets of society, and as novel implications 
unfold. Despite this uncertainty and the intrinsic
incompleteness of the process, it is now common to 
talk of a decidedly new information and communica-
tion environment31 and even of a “fourth revolution 
in the means of production of knowledge, following 
the three prior revolutions of language, writing, and
print.”32
15 At the center of this grand metamorphosis is content, 
taken broadly in the sense of words, sounds, moving 
and still images, which due to digitization are now all
expressible in the same “language” of binary digits, 
of zeroes and ones. It is content that is the driver of 
digital infrastructures, technology, and services, of 
new business and consumer behavior patterns, and 
not the other way around, as was believed at the out-
set of the digital revolution, when the business and 
policy mantra went along the lines of “build them 
and they will come”33 and concentrated all efforts on
laying cables and infrastructure. However, content 
should not be understood here as a static database, 
but as a dynamic process of producing, distributing, 
accessing, mixing, and consuming information, of
creating and expressing culture.34
16 When talking about content, a few characteristics
of the new digital space appear particularly criti-
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cal: (i) the enormous amount and diversity of con-
tent; (ii) its accessibility regardless of place and time
(which is very much in contrast to the “old” push/
point-to-multipoint media); (iii) the empowerment 
of the user; and (iv) the new modes of content pro-
duction, where the user is not merely a consumer 
but is also an active creator, individually or as part 
of the community.35 All of these features hold great 
promise for democratizing communication, for crea-
tivity and innovation.36 Yet it would be foolish to
think that once one starts the Internet browser (i.e., 
having overcome the first and the second digital di-
vides), content is easily and readily findable and ac-
cessible. Here are a few examples to the contrary.
1. Internet Filtering
17 Government censorship has long been common
practice and is relatively well reflected in the po-
licy discussions. So, while in 1998 then US President 
Bill Clinton spoke of the “revolutionary democrati-
zing potential of the Internet,” in 2010, Hillary Clin-
ton, as the Secretary of State, stresses that, “[e]ven as
networks spread to nations around the globe, virtual
walls are cropping up in place of visible walls.”37 It is 
a reality that, despite all the talk about the Internet’s
ability to “route around” censorship, many govern-
ments (and not only undemocratic ones) have pro-
ven adept at extending state control into cyberspace
for a variety of reasons, such as public morality, cul-
tural integrity, and political control.38
18 Internet filtering is not only state censorship stricto 
sensu, but the manner of exercising control varies
in practice. 
Sometimes the law bans citizens from performing 
a particular activity online, such as accessing or 
publishing certain material. Sometimes the state 
takes control into its own hands by erecting tech-
nological or other barriers within the state’s con-
fines to stop the flow of bits from one recipient to 
another. Increasingly, though, the state is turning 
to private parties to carry out the online control. 
Often, those private parties are corporations char-
tered locally or individual citizens who live in that
jurisdiction.39
19 As Palfrey further explicates, it is now often the case
that the state “requires private parties − often in-
termediaries whose services connect one online ac-
tor to another − to participate in online censorship 
and surveillance as a cost of doing business in that 
state.”40
20 The evolutionary trajectory of Internet filtering is 
evident, moving toward more and more sophistica-
ted control mechanisms. As Palfrey notes, we expe-
rience a shift from “open net” (from the Internet’s 
birth to 2000) through “access denied” (2000–2005), 
where crude filters and blocks were installed, to-
ward “access controlled” (2005 onward), where me-
chanisms are multiple and varied, entering at diffe-
rent points of control to limit access to knowledge 
and information.41
2. Privatization of Content
21 The privatization of content seen as a broad phe-
nomenon is another well-known example of limi-
ting access.42 In cyberspace, this phenomenon can be
said to have assumed different dimensions. First and
perhaps most important in terms of law’s function is
the impact of intellectual property (IP). 
22 As the (almost classical now) critical argument goes: 
while the contemporary IP architecture43 has evol-
ved over time and elaborated a broad palette of so-
phisticated and flexible tools “to protect both tra-
ditional and new forms of symbolic value produced 
in particular places as they circulate in global com-
modity markets,”44 it is far from perfect. Some of the
IP system’s deficiencies relate to the inherent cen-
trality of authorship, originality, and mercantilism 
to the “Western” IP model, which leaves numerous 
non-Western, collaborative, or folkloric modes of
production outside the scope of IP protection.45 As a 
result, many expressions of traditional culture are 
without a protective shield, laying them open to mis-
appropriation and abuse,46 and leaving the commu-
nities that created them without an appropriate eco-
nomic reward. In a contemporary context, under the
conditions of the digital environment, there are very
often efforts of commons-based production of infor-
mation, knowledge, and entertainment, where “in-
dividuals band together, contributing small or large 
increments of their time and effort to produce things
they care about”47 not protected by copyright.48
23 The second reason for IP’s imperfections has to do 
with the way IP rights are granted, whereby authors 
receive a temporary monopoly over their creations 
and thus exclude the rest of the public from having 
access to the protected works. The balance between 
private and public interests is critical in this exer-
cise. In the digital ecology, however, it may be under
serious threat: on the one hand, because the Inter-
net has magnified the value of copyright law49 and 
expanded its reach;50 on the other hand, because the 
existent models are often too rigid to allow full rea-
lization of digital content production and distribu-
tion, or render them illegal, possibly significantly
chilling51 creative activities and creative potential.52
24 The balance between authors’ rights and the public 
interest in having access to information becomes all 
the more fragile as it is now common that authors’ 
rights are “assigned away to the distributor of the 
Re-conceptualizing the Global Digital Divide
2011 221 3
work in order to gain access to the channels of distri-
bution and their audience,”53 and these distributors 
(normally big media conglomerates) have been the 
ones who set the terms and determine which works 
are made available to the public, thus exercising sub-
stantial control over existing cultural content. In ad-
dition, under the conditions of digital media, inter-
mediaries have striven to keep perfect control over 
“their property” by means of Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) systems and other technological protec-
tion measures, which under the guise of protecting 
digital content from uncontrolled distribution and 
unlawful use, have had pernicious effects, eroding 
some fundamental rights of consumers and restric-
ting usages traditionally allowed under (analogue/
offline) copyright.54
25 The content industries have also been very success-
ful in their political efforts to expand the scope and 
extend the duration of copyright, effectively con-
vincing most governments that strong and enforce-
able IPRs are the sine qua non for a vibrant culture. 
Through race-to-the-top strategies, this augmented 
protection has been emancipated to the internatio-
nal level in the framework of the TRIPS Agreement 
and in the even further-reaching free trade agree-
ments (FTAs),55 ignoring thereby the checks and ba-
lances originally underlying domestic IP systems.
26 Translating this into the context of the global digi-
tal divide, it is crucial to stress yet again that in cy-
berspace, local decisions have global impact. As La-
tif observes, 
[g]iven the global nature of the Internet, it is also 
important to take into account that if developed 
countries, such as the US, enact restrictive legisla-
tion governing the use of digital and Internet con-
tent and the manner in which it can be accessed, 
this has a direct bearing on developing country ac-
cess to such digital and Internet content.56
27 Latif also underlines the dissimilar implications of 
national and international IP instruments:
Ultimately, the room provided by the Internet Tre-
aties for different countries to adopt different ap-
proaches to the regulation of TPMs, […] has been 
more dramatically altered by national implemen-
tation in the EU and the United States that has
been extended internationally through bilateral
trade agreements.57
28 The imbalances in the pursuit of interests in the IP 
policy domain become particularly evident, as IP is-
sues have remained only marginal in key efforts ai-
med at securing public goods at the international
level. For instance, they do not appear in any me-
aningful way in the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cul-
tural Expressions,58 nor do they figure on the WSIS 
agenda.59
29 The second (not strictly IP-related) dimension of pri-
vatizing content in cyberspace can in fact encompass
many different cases, where access to content beco-
mes conditional on a payment. Privileged access to 
scientific data and knowledge, entertainment, news,
and archives creates a deep divide, with various im-
plications, between those who can afford to pay and 
those who cannot. In the discussions of net neutra-
lity and search engines, one can also see elements 
of the creation of two-tier environments, where
against additional payment, one gets either faster
access to data and traffic or becomes more visible 
on the web. Particularly important in all these con-
texts is that local content and creativity of individu-
als and groups based in developing countries may be
marginalized and thereby chilled.
C. Governing Cyberspace/
Enabling Control
30 There were two myths of cyberspace governance.
The first was that cyberspace is unregulated and the 
second that cyberspace cannot be regulated.60 The
former was in fact never true as even in the initial 
stages of the emergence of cyberspace, many of the 
“analogue/offline” rules at national, regional, and
international levels applied to the Internet as a glo-
bal network of networks and to the World Wide Web.
Yet it is true that as governments grappled with the 
novelty of the medium, “up until the late 1990s, most
states tended either to ignore online activities or to 
regulate them very lightly,”61 especially in compa-
rison with “old” media like telecom and television.
31 This changed, however, and as the Internet became 
intertwined with everyday life and as its economic, 
political, social, and cultural importance grew expo-
nentially, states increasingly intervened. They thus 
dispelled the second myth and effectively erected a 
variety of digital walls, translating many of the real-
space national and international policies into cy-
berspace.62 What we have seen emerging from the 
ashes of these two myths of cyberspace regulation is
a type of “messy” governance, where a “governance 
mix”63 encompassing national and international ef-
forts, as well as private and public–private initiati-
ves, defines the regulatory conditions. This gover-
nance ecology has not yet attained its ultimate shape
and form but is still in flux. Two evolutionary trends 
can be stressed with regard to our discussion. The 
first relates to Lawrence Lessig’s narrative of “code is
law,” while the second brings together observations 
on models of self- and co-regulation in cyberspace. 
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1. From Law to Code
32 Lessig argued that in cyberspace, code is overta-
king the functions of law.64 In contrast to real space, 
where architecture is more or less given, in cyber-
space it is “plastic” and open to change.65 Designing 
cyberspace through software code thus becomes a 
very powerful regulatory activity.66 This code, which
Lessig calls “West Coast Code” (because of its pro-
ximity to Silicon Valley), is starkly different from
the “East Coast Code” (so named because of its pro-
ximity to Washington, DC). The latter encompas-
ses laws as a product of the conventional legisla-
tive processes, which in a democratic state involve 
highly formalized and complex mechanisms and are
subject to a system of checks and balances.67 West 
Coast Code, by contrast, is simply embedded in the 
software; it is cheaper and faster to create but also 
opaque and often not “readable” for citizens. The
experience gained over the last 11 years68 clearly
confirms Lessig’s theory and the move from law to-
ward code in creating mechanisms of control in cy-
berspace. Both governments and corporations69 have
enabled and fostered this move. The above-menti-
oned example of DRM systems is illustrative here as 
well, as these in-built technical protection measures
allow constraints on behavior and use to be imposed
more easily and to a greater extent than through co-
pyright law alone.
2. Emerging Self- and Co-
regulation in Cyberspace
33 As noted above, cyberspace governance is “messy” 
and the role of private actors pivotal. However, as 
almost all actions taken do have global effects, com-
panies increasingly needed to cooperate within dif-
ferent organizational structures and with varying
level of state involvement. There is now clearly ma-
nifest practice of these hybrid types of regulation
in cyberspace encompassing different forms of self- 
and co-regulation.70 Global Internet standards (e.g., 
Internet Engineering Task Force;71 World Wide Web 
Consortium72), domain names (ICANN73), content fil-
tering and rating (e.g., PEGI Online74 and the Global 
Network Initiative75) are a few of the key areas where
such hybrid governance evolves.76
34 These models are often very appropriate to address 
the pertinent specific (and highly technical) ques-
tions. Yet because efforts of self- and co-regula-
tion arise and/or operate at least partially outside 
state control, they are not necessarily designed to 
advance particular public objectives. They also of-
ten rely on voluntary (and self-interested) partici-
pation and compliance, which differentiates their
command of resources, scope, and effectiveness
from those of similar formal regulatory initiatives. 
As they do not have exclusive power within an in-
tegrated legal framework, they may also face com-
petition from other self-regulatory, co-regulatory, 
and formal regulatory bodies, or have to cope with 
patchy legal underpinnings across their geographi-
cal sphere of activity.77
35 In presenting both these regulatory trends in the
context of the digital divide discussion, our prime 
aim is to illustrate that in cyberspace there are mul-
tiple and far-reaching points of control outside for-
mal legal institutions, and that governance is com-
plex and highly fragmented, thus threatening the
availability of public goods and making the pursuit 
of public objectives difficult. Law has been in many 
ways discounted because it has not kept pace with 
the technological advances or because it cannot ef-
ficiently address them.
D. Conclusion
36 Without understating the first two digital divides
(which remain essential for reaching the third),78
we argue that as the Internet becomes more sophis-
ticated and more integrated into economic, social, 
and cultural processes, a “third” generation of divi-
des becomes critical. These divides are drawn not
at the entry, at the “opening gate” to the net, but 
within the net itself.
37 The conceptualization of the digital divide as impe-
ded access to content (from the supply side) may be 
more important in terms of ensuring real partici-
pation and catering for the long-term implications 
of the integration of digital technologies into all fa-
cets of societal life. This is an aspect that is rarely 
addressed, even in comprehensive analyses and po-
litical initiatives such as the WSIS. There are criti-
cal governance choices to be made influencing the 
interplay of public versus private regulation, open 
versus closed technologies, and competitive versus 
collusive markets that need to be considered in the 
global digital divide debates.
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